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Economics and game theory are based on the assumption that people are capable of predicting 
others' actions. The most fundamental solution concepts in Game Theory – Nash equilibrium, 
backward induction, and iterated elimination of dominated strategies – are based on this 
assumption. These concepts require people to be able to view the game from the other players’ 
perspectives, i.e. to understand others’ motives and beliefs. Economists still know little about 
what enables people to put themselves into others’ shoes and how this ability interacts with their 
own preferences and beliefs. In fact, experimental evidence suggests that many people do not 
obey these concepts and frequently behave as if they – counterfactually – believe that others will 
play dominated strategies 1. Social neuroscience provides insights into the neural mechanism 
underlying our capacity to represent others' intentions, beliefs, and desires, referred to as "Theory 
of Mind" or "mentalizing", and the capacity to share the feelings of others, referred to as 
"empathy". We summarize the major findings about the neural basis of mentalizing and 
empathizing and discuss their implications for economics.  
Normal adults are capable of both mentalizing and empathizing. These abilities are useful 
for making self-interested choices because they enable people to predict others’ actions more 
accurately. However, empathy is also likely to render people less selfish because it allows the 
sharing of emotions and feelings with others and therefore motivates other-regarding behavior. In 
fact, neuroscientific empathy experiments indicate that the same affective brain circuits are 
automatically activated when we feel pain and when others feel pain. Therefore, empathy renders 
our emotions other-regarding, which provides the motivational basis for other-regarding 
behavior.  
I. Mind reading 
Since several decades, research in developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive 
neuroscience has focused on the human ability to have a "theory of mind” or to "mentalize" 
(e.g., Uta Frith and Christopher D. Frith, 2003), that is, to make attributions about the mental 
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states (desires, beliefs, intentions) of others. This ability is absent in monkeys and only exists in a 
rudimentary form in apes (Daniel J. Povinelli and Jess M. Bering, 2002). It develops by about age 
five and is impaired in autism. The lack of a theory of mind in most autistic children could 
explain their observed failures in communication and social interaction. Recent imaging studies 
on normal healthy adults have focused on the ability to "mentalize" and have used a wide range 
of stimuli which represented the intentions, beliefs, and desires of the people involved (for a 
review, see Helen L. Gallagher & Frith, 2003). Several recent studies, for example, involved the 
brain imaging of subjects while they played strategic games 2, Gallagher et al., 2002, Camerer 
and Bhatt, forthcoming) with another partner outside the scanner room. The first two studies 
examine the brain areas involved when a subject plays against an intentional actor (i.e., another 
person) as compared to playing against a computer. The study by Camerer and Bhatt explicitly 
examines brain activity in choice tasks and belief formation tasks. All these studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated the involvement of one brain area, a part of the medial prefrontal lobe 
called the anterior paracingulate cortex. This brain area is not only involved when mentalizing 
about the thoughts, intentions or beliefs of others, but also when people are attending to their own 
states. Frith and Frith (2003) suggest that this area subserves the formation of decoupled 
representations of beliefs about the world, "decoupled" in the sense that they are decoupled from 
the actual state of the world and that they may or may not correspond to reality. 
A related line of research has focused on the investigation of the neural mechanism 
underlying our ability to represent others' goals and intentions by the mere observation of their 
motor actions. This notion stems from the finding that there are neurons in the premotor cortex of 
the macaque brain that fire both when the monkey performs a hand action itself and when it 
merely observes another monkey or a human performing the same hand action (Giacomo 
Rizzolatti et al. 1996). It has been suggested that these “mirror neurons” represent the neural 
basis for imitation. Thus, when we imitate someone, we first observe the action and then try to 
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reproduce it. But how do we transform what we see in terms of perceptual input into knowledge 
of what we need to do in terms of motor commands? The discovery of mirror neurons 
demonstrated that a translation mechanism is present in the primate brain and automatically 
elicited when viewing others' actions. Moreover, Vittorio Gallese and Alvin Goldman (1998) 
suggest that this mirror system might underlie our ability to share others' mental states, providing 
us with an automatic simulation of their actions, goals, and intentions. A similar common coding 
of the production and perception of motor action has been demonstrated in the human brain using 
imaging techniques such as PET and fMRI since the discovery of these “mirror neurons” (for a 
review, see Julie Grezes and Jean Decety, 2001).  
 
II. Empathy 
In addition to the ability to understand mental states of others, humans can also empathize with 
others, that is, share their feelings and emotions in the absence of any direct emotional 
stimulation to themselves. Humans can feel empathy for other people in a wide variety of 
contexts: for basic emotions and sensations such as anger, fear, sadness, joy, pain, and lust, as 
well as for more complex emotions such as guilt, embarrassment, and love. The idea that a neural 
system enables people to share others' mental states has recently been expanded to include the 
ability to share their feelings and sensations (e.g., Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de 
Waal, 2002). How can we understand what someone else feels when he or she experiences 
emotions such as sadness or happiness, or bodily sensations such as pain, touch or tickling, in the 
absence of any emotional or sensory stimulation to our own body? Influenced by perception-
action models of motor behavior and imitation, Preston and de Waal (2002) proposed a 
neuroscientific model of empathy, suggesting that observation or imagination of another person 
in a particular emotional state automatically activates a representation of that state in the observer 
with its associated autonomic and somatic responses. The term "automatic" in this case refers to a 
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process that does not require conscious and effortful processing but which can nevertheless be 
inhibited or controlled. Imaging studies in the last two years have started to investigate brain 
activity associated with different empathic responses in the domain of touch, smell, and pain. The 
results have revealed common neural responses elicited by observation of pictures showing 
disgusted faces and smelling disgusting odors oneself (Bruno Wicker et al., 2003) and by being 
touched and observing someone else being touched in a video (Christian Keysers et al., 2004). 
Another study could identify shared and unique networks involved in empathy for pain 3. We will 
explain the latter study in more detail in order to illustrate how empathic responses can be 
measured using functional MRI. In this study, couples who were in love with each other were 
recruited; empathy was assessed "in vivo" by bringing both woman and man into the same 
scanner environment. More specifically, brain activity was assessed in the female partner while 
painful stimulation was applied either to her own or to her partner’s right hand via electrodes 
attached to the back of the hand. The male partner was seated next to the MRI scanner and a 
mirror system allowed her to see both, her own and her partners’ hands lying on a tilted board in 
front of her. Flashes of different colors on a big screen behind the board pointed either to her 
hand or that of her partner, indicating which of them would receive the painful stimulation and 
which would be subject to the non-painful stimulation. This procedure enabled the measurement 
of pain-related brain activation when pain was applied to the scanned subject (the so-called "pain 
matrix") or to her partner (empathy for pain). The results suggest that some parts, but not the 
entire, "pain matrix" were activated when empathizing with the pain of others. Activity in the 
primary and secondary somato-sensory cortex was only observed when receiving pain. These 
areas are known to be involved in the processing of the sensory-discriminatory components of 
our pain experience, that is, they indicate the location of the pain and its objective quality. In 
contrast, bilateral anterior insula (AI), the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and 
cerebellum were activated when subjects either received pain or a signal that a loved one 
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experienced pain. These areas are involved in the processing of the affective component of pain, 
that is, how unpleasant the subjectively felt pain is. Thus, both the experience of pain to oneself 
and the knowledge that a loved partner experiences pain activates the same affective pain circuits, 
suggesting that if a loved partner suffers pain, our brains also make us suffer from this pain. 
These findings suggest that we use representations reflecting our own emotional responses to 
pain to understand how the pain of others feels. Moreover, our ability to empathize may have 
evolved from a system which represents our own internal feeling states and allows us to predict 
the affective outcomes of an event for ourselves and for other people.  
The results of the Singer et al. study further suggest that the empathic response is rather 
automatic and does not require active engagement of some explicit judgments about others' 
feelings. The scanned subject did not know that the experiment was about empathy; subjects were 
just instructed to do nothing but observe the flashes that indicate either pain to the subject or the 
loved partner. The analysis also confirmed that the ability to empathize is heterogeneous across 
individuals; standard empathy questionnaires and the strength of the activation in the affective 
pain regions (AI and ACC) when the partner received pain was used to assess this heterogeneity. 
Interestingly, individual heterogeneity measured by the empathy questionnaire was highly 
correlated with individual differences that were measured by brain activation in AI and ACC. 
Thus, neural evidence and questionnaire evidence on empathy mutually reinforce each other.  
Does empathy also extend to unknown persons? The results of three recent studies 
indicate that empathic responses are also elicited when scanned subjects do not know the person 
in pain. Activity in ACC and AI has also been observed when subjects witness still pictures 
depicting body parts involved in possibly painful situations (Philip L. Jackson et al., in press) or 
videos showing a needle stinging in the back of a hand (India Morrison et al., 2004). At the 
moment, Singer and collaborators are investigating whether the level of empathic response in 
ACC and AI can be modulated by the fact whether the subject likes or dislikes the "object of 
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empathy". In this study, actors are paid to pretend to be naive subjects participating in two 
independent experiments, one on "social exchange" the other one on the "processing of pain". In 
the first experiment, the two confederates repeatedly play a sequential Prisoner Dilemma Game 
in the position of the second mover with the scanned subject. One actor plays a fair strategy and 
usually reciprocates cooperative first mover choices with cooperation; the other actor plays 
unfairly and defects in response to first mover cooperation most of the time. Based on behavioral 
and neuronal findings of a previous imaging study which revealed verbally reported liking and 
disliking as well as emotion-related brain activation in responses to faces of people who had 
previously cooperated or defected (Singer et al., 2004a), we expect to induce subjects to like fair 
players and to dislike unfair ones. In the second part of the experiment, all three players 
participate in a pain study that expands the approach by Singer et al. (2004b). One actor sits on 
each side of the scanner, enabling the scanned subject to observe flashes of different colors 
indicating high or low pain stimulation to his/her hand or to those of the fair or unfair players. 
We predict empathy-related activation in ACC and AI when observing the unfamiliar but likeable 
person receiving painful stimulation. However, based on the results of a recent imaging study that 
reports reward-related activity when players could punish defectors in a sequential Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game 4, we further predict a lack of empathy-related brain activation and an increase in 
activity in reward-related areas when perceiving a previous defector getting pain, that is, getting 
punished. Such a pattern of results would contribute to the microfoundation for theories of social 
preferences. These theories suggest that people’s valuations of other players’ payoffs depend on 
the fairness of their previous behavior 5: many people value others’ payoffs positively if others 
behaved fairly; however, people also value others’ payoffs negatively if they behaved unfairly. 
This pattern of preferences implies that people prefer cooperating with fair opponents while 
favoring the punishment of unfair opponents.  
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III. Implications for economics 
Mind reading and empathy are two lines of research which have recently emerged in social 
neuroscience. Even though these abilities seem to rely on different neural circuitries, both 
concepts do in fact have common features. Both allow humans to represent states of other people 
– others’ intentions, beliefs, and thoughts or their feeling states based on emotions and 
sensations. These abilities enable people to predict others' behavior and, therefore, help them 
meet their individual goals. As an example, imagine that you are a first mover in a social 
exchange situation like the sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma. Your attempt to predict whether the 
opponent will reciprocate a cooperative choice will rely on your belief about his type (i.e., 
whether you believe him to be a fair person with a desire to reciprocate or not). However, if you 
believe that the other person is a reciprocator, you also need to understand his actual feeling and 
motivational state. If, for example, the other player is angry because you repeatedly violated his 
sense of fairness he will probably not reciprocate your trust. Your capacity to empathize, that is, 
to simulate the internal state resulting from being cheated in a social exchange will help you to 
predict the opponent’s likely action. Thus, the ability to empathize is useful from a self-interested 
point of view. However, the very ability to empathize may also undermine purely self-interested 
choices and may promote other-regarding behavior. In fact, there is evidence 6 suggesting that 
affective concern for others and perspective taking is positively related to prosocial behavior 
(defined as voluntary behavior intended to benefit others). 
An important feature of the outlined mechanisms is that they mostly rely on automatic 
processes. We represent the goals of others in terms of our own goals, without even being aware 
of it. Without thinking, the perceived feelings of others automatically activate brain networks that 
also represent our own feeling states; we automatically share other people’s feelings. Thus, as our 
own feelings and emotions are important determinants of our motives our behavior may be 
automatically other-regarding unless we inhibit the other-regarding impulses. Therefore, 
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empathic concern may establish a link between the ability to predict other’s motives and the 
nature of the own motives, that is, other people’s emotions may partly shape our own motives 
towards them. To provide an example: if shown a picture of a malnourished child with a swollen 
belly, many people empathize with this child and are therefore willing to incur cost to help the 
child (e.g., by donating money to charities that operate in third world countries).  
The study by Singer et al. (2004b) suggests that there are individual differences in 
empathic abilities. Therefore, the hypothesized link between empathic abilities and the prediction 
of other players’ motives and actions suggests a testable prediction: people with stronger 
empathic abilities are better predictors of others' motives and actions. Moreover, the hypothesis 
that empathy enhances other-regarding behavior in combination with the existence of individual 
differences in empathy suggests that people who exhibit more affective concern are more likely 
to display altruistic behaviors. In analogy to the findings of Singer et al. (2004b) we also predict 
that people with higher scores in their perspective taking ability should display higher activation 
in areas shown to be activated by Theory of Mind tasks (e.g., mPFC) and by consequence these 
people should also be better in predicting the actions of others. An interesting question for future 
research is to determine the relative importance of our ability to empathize and to mentalize for 
the prediction of motives and actions of others in different situations.  
Neuroscientific research on mentalizing and empathizing may also help explain how 
individuals actually assess other players’ types in games with incomplete information about 
preferences. Economists make a technical shortcut in games with incomplete information by 
assuming a common prior distribution over players’ potential preferences (“types”). While this 
shortcut has enabled economists to solve games with incomplete information, the question about 
the determinants of this prior probability distribution has not been addressed. In fact, the 
assumption of a prior distribution over types constitutes a huge black box. Neuroeconomic 
research may help us to understand what is going on in this black box. 
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